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PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF
THE SPACE SHUTTLE: SOME LEGAL PROBLEMS
RELATED TO MARKET ENTRY
GEORGE S. ROBINSON*
I. ESTABLISHING A PRIVATE SPACELINE - THE FIRST OBSTACLEM OST OF THE private enterprise constituency interested in participating
in the commercial exploitation of near and deep space will be subject
to a multitude of new laws and entire legal regimes, ranging in scope from
public and private international law' to domestic legislation,' implementing
regulations and, even the old and new anti-trust laws.' The majority of the
interested business community has no idea that an amalgam of specific legal
principles and regimes already exists of sufficient distinction to be called
"space law."'
There are comparatively few professionals in the legal community who
are competent to guide the private sector around the pitfalls and entangle-
ments in various international fora which relate to the commercial exploita-
*Assistant General Counsel of the Smithsonian Institution; B.A., Bowdoin College, LL.B.
University of Virginia Law School; LL.M., D.C.L. Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill
University, Montreal, Canada; former legal counsel for the Federal Aviation Administration,
and International Relations Specialist at NASA.
I Examples of the prevailing public international law documents are those treaties negotiated
under the auspices of the United Nations and its expert organizations and include the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.IA.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) (hereinafter the Outer
Space Treaty); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599 (effective Dec. 3, 1968); and the Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762
(effective Oct. 9, 1973). Private international law would include contractual arrangement
among space industry representatives, universities, and the like, which are participating in a
given space project, program, or venture.
2 Examples are the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2471 et. seq. (1976) (hereinafter the NASAct) the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1976) (hereinafter the FAAct); the Communications Satellite Act
of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq. (1976). Another special area of interest is product liability.
See, Donnelly, A Space-Age Revisit to the Principles of MacPherson v. Buick, 49 A.B.A.J. 878
(1963), and Product Liability Costs May Spur Legislation, 106 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH. 17
(Jan. 10, 1977).
8 See, Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which pur-
ports to amend the Clayton Act.
4 It was not until about 1970 that the legal profession began to feel comfortable using the
term "space law." Prior to that time, lawyers with an eye to the potential of space ex-
ploration's involvement of the legal profession made tentative public reference to "space
activities and international law." However, the International Institute of Space Law, con-
sisting of prominent jurists worldwide, became a respected affiliate of the International
Astronautical Federation. Also, within the graduate law faculty of McGill University,
Montreal, Canada, is the highly respected Institute and Center of Air and Space Law,
which has been training practicing attorneys from around the world in air and space
law for approximately twenty-five years.
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tion of space. A very sensitive litmus to these pitfalls and obstacles will be the
efforts of private industry to enter the service market which provides man-
agement and operation of the United States designed and manufactured space
shuttle;5 presently manned and operated by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.' If a corporate decision were taken somewhere in
private enterprise to manage and operate a commercial space shuttle venture,
one of the first considerations would be the legal status of the existing com-
petition, i.e., NASA.
II. NASA's SHUTTLE: THE UNCOMMON COMMON CARRIER7
All I can say is we are organizing to operate like an airline . . . The
idea is we are trying to recognize its business-like operation.'
As part of the private corporate decision-making process to enter the
commercial market of space shuttle services, the question must be put and
resolved as to whether there really is any future for private enterprise to
participate in the opportunities of a manned space transportation system
(commonly referred to as STS). Will circumstances permit, say, the airlines
or related industry to expand into spacelines? Will the United States gov-
ernment invoke a combined political, economic, and military theory of
parens patriae to protect such an industry from stepping into an area in
which it presently has no operational and financial capability? Put more
directly, will NASA continue to develop, manage, and operate exclusively
the free world's only access to a commercially viable, manned space trans-
portation system?10
5 The Space Shuttle is only a component of a much broader and highly sophisticated
space transportation system concept. For a detailed review of this concept, see, Space Trans-
portation System: Hearings (Including Report) Before the Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology of the House Committee on
Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977).
6 The management and operation of the Shuttle at this point in time is carried out by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter referred to as NASA); pur-
portedly under the authority of the NASAct of 1958, supra note 2.
7 For one comprehensive view that the shuttle management and operation by NASA in
a commercial market does not contravene any domestic or international law, see, Sloup,
The NASA Space Shuttle and Other Aerospace Vehicles: A Primer for Lawyers on Legal
Characterization, 8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J., 403, 403-453 (1978).
8 Statement by Jon M. Smith, NASA Director of Pricing, Launch Agreement and Customer
Service Engineering, at the Space Shuttle Workshop, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
D.C. (July 15, 1977).
9 For a brief discussion of the only attempt to date to determine the fiscal and management
capability and interests of airlines industry to enter the arena of space transportation, and
the current attitudes of several airline corporate managers and officers, see, W.A. Good,
Strategy, Structure, and Environment in Multinational, Multimodal Transportation Under
Deregulation in the Age of Space Industrialization (April 2, 1979) (Unpublished Outline
of a Proposed Dissertation for the Ph.D. Degree, New York University Graduate School
of Business Administration).
10 For one view to the effect that high costs of innovative research and development by
the government do not require the marketing and/or management by the government of
the end product in a commercial market, see, Stevenson, The New Era in Space, 7 J. CON-
TEMP. Bus. 7, 7-12 (1978). In this context, an interesting discussion of the history of gov-
ernmental support of private airlines can be found in Report of the Cab Special Staff
[Vol. 13:4
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No credible effort is being made presently by NASA to induce signifi-
cant private participation in the management and operation of the space
transportation system, particularly with respect to the shuttle component.
Although one can only speculate as to why NASA asserts and follows a
"policy" of strict management control and operational exclusivity, it is pos-
sible to make a more definitive evaluation of the legality of such a policy
under existing legislation and implementing regulations. Inherent in such
an evaluation are determinations of whether the shuttle is an "aircraft" so
as to fall within the legislative and regulatory ambience of the Federal Avi-
ation Act of 1958 (FAAct),"' whether it will be operated routinely, and
whether it can be considered as operating de facto, if not de jure, as a com-
mon carrier.
NASA is a research and development administration of the executive
branch of the Federal Government. The expenditure of NASA appropri-
ations can be either as a partner of private enterprise, by contracting research
and development requirements out to the private sector; or the expenditures
can take the form of competition with the private business community: e.g.,
"it can support construction, staffing and operation of government-owned
facilities."' In fact, NASA has retained control over the management and
operation of the space shuttle for the time being, apparently deciding that
ultimate industrialization of space through the use of the shuttle can best be
accomplished by governmental competition with the private sector, or at least
some form of competition within the context of a quasi-partnership.
Although the market risks to potential private developers, manufactur-
ers, and service operators are considerable, NASA could help the private
business community overcome the significant difficulty of finding sufficient
risk capital in the public market place by "contracting out" for research
and development services in a way that is supportive of private sector in-
house capabilities, rather than competitive. NASA, however, has elected to
be competitive in managing and operating the shuttle, thereby eliminating
the effective development of private sector capabilities and capital from the
space transportation system: e.g., in the area of shuttle crew-selection and
training which ignores the experience and capabilities of the commercial
airlines industry.
As noted by Harold S. Becker of The Futures Group, a management
consulting firm specializing in policy analysis, located in Glastonbury, Con-
necticut:
on Regulatory Reform (July 1975). For an excellent recounting of the history of NASA's
involvement with, and relationship to, the design, fabrication, management, and operation
of the shuttle, see, Logsdon, The Space Shuttle Decision: Technology and Political Choice,
7 J. CoNT rM'. Bus. 13, 13-29 (1978).
1149 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1976).
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[g]rowth of government-accomplished R&D (research and develop-
ment), especially under the auspices of NASA programs, seems to
have engendered a growing spirit of competition between scientists
and engineers in the public and private sectors. Government employees
often seek out ideas for new technologies from the private sector but
are reticent to share insights. This is because such insights are em-
ployed to justify federal budget requests for R&D programs that main-
tain employment levels at various government centers.
The search for personal recognition in the pursuit and development
of technologies is not an insignificant factor in inhibiting communica-
tions about and exploitation of technology."
Not just the scientists and engineers are in competition with their vested
interests; management representatives of NASA who are connected with
research and development and operations aspects of the space transportation
system have a vested interest in seeing that their careers with NASA are
secured by cornering the market on operations management of the shuttle.1"'
m. IMPORTANCE OF DETERMINING WHETHER THE SPACE SHUTTLE
IS AN AIRCRAFT
At some point prior to March 1977, NASA officials asked the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), within the Department of Transportation,
to render a legal opinion whether the shuttle would be an "aircraft" as
defined in Section 101 (5) of the FAAct. 5 Presumably, NASA was con-
cerned that the shuttle might be subject to the airworthiness, operational,
navigational, and economic regulations of the FAA and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board" to the extent it might function as a scheduled or charter
Is 1d. at 149.
24The pricing methods for shuttle use by users in government and the private sector seem
to support this possibility, regardless of whether it was a considered factor in establishing
the pricing procedures. In this context, see generally, Jordan, Commercial STS Prices: AnEconomic Analysis, 7 J. CONTEMP. Bus. 41, 41-62 (1978); and Gibson, Macroeconomic
Implications of Space Technology, 7 J. CONTEmP. Bus. 81, 81-97 (1978).
a5The opinion requested was rendered in letter from the Chief Counsel of the FAA,Bert Goodwin, to the General Counsel of NASA, S. Neil Hosenball (March 11,1977). § 101(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 defines "aircraft" to mean "any
contrivance now known or hereinafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of orflight in the air." [Emphasis added] 14 C.F.R. 1.1 presently defines "aircraft" as "a devicethat is used or is intended to be used for flight in the air." "Airplane" is defined as "an
engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft heavier than air, that is supported in flight by the dynamic
reaction of the air against its wings." The space shuttle fits both definitions. "Navigable
airspace" means "airspace at and above the minimum flight altitude prescribed by or under
this chapter, including airspace needed for safe takeoff and landing." There is no question
whatever that the Congress was speculating about any and all technological innovations
that might be designed in the future and used in navigable airspace. There is no indication
the definition was limited to "military and civilian airplanes," as asserted by the FAA'sChief Counsel in the March 11, 1977 memorandum. Whether this legal opinion is the
official view of the Department of Transportation is unimportant since it is the opinion re-lied upon by NASA to exempt itself from the mandates of the FAAct of 1958.16Under President Jimmy Carter's airline deregulation policy, the Civil Aeronautics Board
is subject to a "sunset provision," which means it is subject to termination in 1985. See,Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (a) (4) (Supp. 1978).
(Vol. 13:4
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aircraft for hire, at least while in navigable air space, as distinguished from
near-Earth or outer space.
The opinion from the Chief Counsel of the FAA was in the form of a
letter, dated March 11, 1977, to the General Counsel of NASA, S. Neil
Hosenball, and it could easily be interpreted to have been formulated by
NASA. Certainly, the conclusion supported NASA's desire not to be hind-
ered by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Civil Aeronautics Board,
and the commercial airlines industry in the development, management, and
routine operation of the shuttle.
According to the FAA, the space shuttle is not an aircraft "for the
purposes of the FAAct respecting applicability of the Federal Aviation
Regulations... ." Starting with the premise that "any man-made object
moving through the air might arguably be called an aircraft," the Chief
Counsel of the FAA turned to the "legislative intent and purpose behind the
regulatory scheme of the FAAct," and determined "that a major purpose of
the [Act] was to unify control and management of the air space in a single
agency." This is erroneous reasoning since FAAct specifically refers to
navigable airspace, thereby confining its scope not to geophysical delimita-
tions, but rather to a function, i.e., aerodynamic navigation and anything
related to the safety and efficiency of that function in the ambience of air
space." It is clear, then, that given at least the operational aerodynamics
and navigational characteristics of the shuttle while departing from and
returning to Earth's surface through navigable air space, and its very im-
pact on the safe and efficient use of air space by simply being present in it,
would render the shuttle an aircraft for that period of time.
Compounding this misinterpretation of the FAAct, the Chief Counsel
of the FAA stated that "[floremost in the minds of the drafters were military
and civilian airplanes. The idea then that rockets or spacecraft would routine-
ly traverse the air space was mere speculation only months after Sputnik I
was launched." (emphasis added) In one careless sweep, the Chief Counsel
of the FAA dismissed all the other functional equipment which is regulated
under the FAAct: e.g., hot-air balloons, anchored kites, rocketry, model
aircraft, and military ordnance, such as heavy artillery, laser tracking tech-
niques, ground-to-air missiles, and the like. All of these activities were taking
place in navigable air space throughout the world, as well as the United
States, many years prior to the launching of Sputnik I.
"In fact," continued the Chief Counsel, "the statutory creation of
17 Unless otherwise cited, the ensuing quotations are from the March 11, 1977 letter from
the FAA Chief Counsel to NASA's General Counsel. See Id.
is Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 2 at § 1348(a), provides that the Administrator
of the FAA: is authorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect
to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of
the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem
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NASA... was barely one month earlier than the effective date of the FAAct,"
apparently reasoning that rocketry and traversing air space to near and
outer space was not seriously contemplated prior to passage of the NASAct
and the FAAct of 1958. It was convenient to forget that the first "A" in
"NASA" refers to aeronautics and that the NASAct is derived in large part
from the transfer of certain functions previously carded out by the Depart-
ment of Defense," and further, that the FAAct flowed from the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938.20 Rockets were being tested and launched long before
the creation of NASA, and non-aircraft equipment was navigating in air
space long before the Federal Aviation Agency was established."'
Another argument put forth to establish that the shuttle is not an air-
craft under the FAAct, and therefore, not subject to the airworthiness
and navigation regulations of the FAA and the economic regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, is that upon returning to Earth through air space
the shuttle operates like a glider. As a result, its trajectory is far steeper
than an aircraft, and the length of time it functions in navigable air space
is only three minutes and eight seconds. "The vast majority of its operational
time is spent in a space, not air, environment."22 In this respect, it should be
noted that gliders are subject to the Federal Aviation Regulations, return
trajectory and glide angles of the shuttle in air space are often more shallow
than many noise abatement procedures imposed on commercial aircraft by
Federal Aviation Regulations and time in navigable air space is not an
exclusive criterion; safe separation of aircraft from other aircraft and users of
navigable air space can be, and often is, only a matter of seconds.2"
It should be kept in mind that ultimately the shuttle will be re-oriented
to a launching in one country with a return landing from space in another
country, or perhaps even another continent.24 An integral facet of the Soviet
19 For the legislative history and purpose of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958 (P.L. 85-568), see (1958) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3160.
20The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created the Civil Aeronautics Board, the functions
of which were subsequently incorporated into the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. These
functions were then again transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board in 1966
by P.L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, [codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1655 (d), 1657 (g) (1976)].
21he Federal Aviation Agency, an independent agency of the executive branch of the
Government, became the Federal Aviation Administration when all duties and functions
were transferred in 1966 to the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to P.L. 85-726, 72
Stat. 731, and P.L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 [codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1655(c), 1657(f) (1976)].
22See, March 11, 1977 letter from the FAA's Chief Counsel to NASA's General Counsel,
supra notes 15, 17.
22 During peak hours at major metropolitan airports around the world, observers can
note that commercial air carriers mixed with general aviation aircraft are taking off or
landing on the same runway in as little time as every 30 seconds.
24 It is interesting to note that under the auspices of the Sabre Foundation in Santa
Barbara, California, a Space Freeport Project has been initiated whereby a space port
would be established in an equatorial country to provide the first international launching
site for manned and unmanned vehicles in a "free trade zone" environment and outside
the manned spaceflight launching facilities of the United States and the Soviet Union.
For example, the government of Liberia has been approached by representatives of the
[V/ol. 13:4
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shuttle design is a long return glide capability over several countries or con-
tinents to fulfill the military requirements of the U.S.S.R."' Further, there
is nothing either in the NASAct or the FAAct to prohibit the shuttle from
being under the jurisdictional control of both the FAA and NASA at differ-
ent times according to its shifts in operational modes from spacecraft to
aircraft.28
Finally, the FAA legal opinion asserts that NASA legislation combines
"aeronautical vehicles" with "space vehicles" because the drafters of the
NASAct did not mention in Section 103 that "space vehicles" were a sepa-
rate and distinct category. On the other hand, the NASAct, like almost all
Federal legislation establishing Executive Branch departments and agencies,
is functional in essence, and not definitional. The primary function of NASA,
according to its enabling legislation, is to carry out basic research and de-
velopment in the field of advanced aeronautics and space exploration. If the
shuttle is not operated routinely and/or commercially as NASA asserts,2"
it is still subject to the Federal Aviation Regulations as an experimental craft
operating in navigable air space.
For these reasons, as a matter of law, the shuttle must be considered
an aircraft while functioning in navigable air space and, therefore, subject
to the appropriate operational and airworthiness regulations promulgated
pursuant to the authority and jurisdiction established by the FAAct. The
next question to decide is whether management and operation of the shuttle
by NASA is subject to other legislation and implementing regulations ori-
ented toward the provision of a service to the public for compensation.
IV. NASA's SHUTTLE: THE UNCOMMON COMMON CARRIER
In an August 18, 1977 memorandum from NASA Deputy General
Counsel, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, to NASA General Counsel, S. Neil Hosen-
ball, the opinion was asserted that there was no need for substantive amend-
ments to the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (NASAct) for
NASA to proceed into the day-to-day operations of the space shuttle
Space Freeport Project for the purpose of establishing within a 200 square mile area, a
space freeport to be administered by a Free Zone Authority as the designated development
agent of the Liberian government. Chances of success are slim at this time, but serious
thought and planning is being given to the international movement of goods, products, and
equipment through the intervening medium of space.
25See, P.N. JAMES, SOVIET CONQUEST FROM SPACE (1974); See, specifically, Chapter 11,
"The Soviet Space Shuttle Program" at 125-142.
26 Another obvious example is the nautical as well as the aeronautical jurisdiction exercised
over the various operations of seaplanes. Also, the flying automobile is another example of
a multiple function piece of equipment that operates in air as well as on public roads. For
a comprehensive article discussing the operational and definitional nature of the shuttle, see,
Sloup, supra note 13.
27 See, Space Transportation System, Hearings (Including Report), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1977) (Memorandum from Deputy General Counsel of NASA to General Counsel of
NASA (Aug. 18, 1977), setting forth arguments in support of these assertions).
Spring, 1980]
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and other elements of the overall space transportation system. 8 The memo-
randum did conclude, however, that this opinion should be reviewed at the
time NASA submits its fiscal year 1979 legislative program; presumably
in the event shuttle development and the sale of its use to the public had
proceeded to the point where clarifying legislation would be prudent.
NASA has taken the position that its enabling legislation provides
adequate authority for it to operate the STS on a routine basis. Sections 102
and 103 of the NASAct, as amended, make it perfectly clear that NASA's
authority, except where it specifically refers to military weapons and national
security, is for the research which relates to the use of aeronautics and space
activities for peaceful and scientific purposes. 9
The legislative history of the NASAct shows that the purpose of Section
103 is "to make clear that the Act is concerned primarily with research,
development, and exploration." This history emphasizes that the definition
of "activities" in this context is intended to be broad because no one can
predict with certainty what the future requirements of space or aeronautical
research will be. 0 However:
[i]t is not the intention of Congress . . . to construe activities so
broadly as to include such things as the operation of commercial air-
lines . . . or the assigning of certificates of public convenience and
necessity. Whether, in time, the new Administration will run a regular
transport route to another planet or to the Moon is not a matter of
current concern. But the term 'activities' should be construed broadly
enough to enable the Administration and the Department of Defense
(DOD), in their respective fields, to carry on a wide spectrum of
activities which relate to the successful use of outer space."1
The legislative history specifically emphasizes that "these activities would
include scientific discovery and research not directly related to travel in outer
space but utilizing outer space, and the development of resources which
may be discovered in outer space.""2 (emphasis added)
It is reasonable to interpret the NASAct as permitting routine STS oper-
ations by NASA for non-commercial and non-competitive research and
development. NASA is authorized to establish and charge fees for the
launching and services associated with a research and development project.
But the real issues are the nature of the service provided, how the charges
ultimately will be determined, and whether routine launchings of scientific
research satellites are translatable into operations and services which are
2 8 ld.
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451, 2452 (1976).
1 See, [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3160.
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clearly of commercial viability and which have potential for management
and operation by private industry.3"
NASA has made the assumption that adequate authority already exists
for it to develop and operate the STS routinely, not only for launching its
own payloads, with federal appropriations; but also for launching payloads of
other United States government agencies and departments, foreign countries
and alien citizens, and for international public and private organizations on
a reimbursable basis.3 '
On July 20, 1962 the Telstar I satellite was launched for the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company with an expendable Delta launch ve-
hicle. It was the first satellite owned by private entrprise3 5 Telstar II was
launched on May 7, 1963. On June 28, 1965 commercial telecommunication
satellite service was started following the launching on April 6, 1963 of
Intelsat I ("Early Bird") for the Communications Satellite Corporation (here-
inafter, Comsat). Since that time, there have been at least 22 additional
launchings of Comsat/Intelsat communication satellites, plus six communi-
cations satellites for domestic U.S. service and three for maritime service.8"
In recent years, the reimbursable launchings conducted by NASA
have begun to outnumber NASA's own launchings, including cooperative
launchings with other countries or international organizations. For example,
in 1975 there were eight reimbursable launchings out of a total of nineteen,
33 Speech by Gilbert W. Keyes, Deputy Manager, Strategy Planning and Market Develop-
ment, Boeing Aerospace Company, before the American Astronautical Society (March 29,
1979). Mr. Keyes stated that a number of as yet undefined alternatives are being con-
sidered by Boeing regarding private management and operation of the shuttle . . . "among
them are the operation of the shuttle fleet at one or both sites through private operation,
as well as the possible acquisition of space shuttle orbiters."
34 The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (effective Oct. 9, 1973) (hereinafter the
Liability Convention) will have a substantial impact on market entry of foreign countries and
alien citizens, and for international public and private organizations. Specific provisions of
the Liability Convention that will have an affect on market entry are: (1) Article II-
which places on the launching State absolute liability for damage caused by its space
objects; (2) Article I-which defines "launching state"; (3) Article V-which deals with
joint and several liability when two or more States jointly launch a space object; and (4)
Article VII-which deals with the issue of damage caused to the Nationals of the launching
state by a space object of the launching state or to its Foreign Nationals while participating
in the operation of the space object which causes the damage. As a result of these provisions
an extensive insurance and idemnification Agreement will have to be developed between the
United States and any foreign states or foreign nationals which plan to contract for U.S.
Shuttle use.
35 An extensive insurance and indemnification program will also have to be developed
before private enterprise will be able to enter the market on any type of substantial basis.
The reason being that international law requires States that are a party to the Outer
Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
(effective Oct. 10, 1967), see, supra note 1, assume international responsibility for activities
carried on in outer space by its nationals; Specially see, The Outer Space Treaty at Article
VL Also see, the Liability Convention, Id. See Generally, Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Lia-
bility Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle, 7 J. OF SPACE L. 121 (1970).
36 These statistics and those more current are available from the Office of External Affairs,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Spring, 1980]
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and in 1976 there were twelve launchings out of sixteen. In 1977 NASA
launched only four major payloads of its own out of twenty-four launchings.
The reimbursable portion of NASA's annual program is specifically
delineated in the NASA budget and separated from that portion of the
program budgeting that is funded by Congressional appropriations. The
view of NASA that it can operate both unmanned and manned shuttle
launchings routinely on a reimbursable basis seems to be reinforced by the
annual Congressional approval of the funding for these activities. But that
does not necessarily mean that Congress has confronted the question of
whether NASA is, or will be, operating legally on a reimbursable basis
in an area of commercial viability and potentiality for operation by private
industry. In fact, NASA may well be planning to use the shuttle to operate
as a common carrier in spite of its lack of authority to do so.
It should be kept in mind that reimbursement of actual costs for
services provided by the government can sustain the management and
operational staff for so long as the market remains. In other words, a "comer
on the market" is ensured for such government programs, unless challenged
by private entrepreneurs or the threat of reduced appropriations.
While the NASAct provides NASA with authority sufficient to operate
the shuttle on a routine basis for scientific research and space exploration
purposes, it does not provide the authority necessary for NASA to operate
the shuttle routinely for compensation or otherwise as a common carrier.
Neither the FAAct nor the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (here-
inafter Comsat Act)"7 legislatively authorizes NASA in any way to serve as
a common carrier.
The Comsat Act does create a duty for NASA to provide "satellite
launching and associated services" to Comsat, but it is a duty which relates
only to this corporation and not to the general public. A common carrier,
however, is one which is required to hold itself out to the public as engaged
in a certain type of service available to the general public for compensation.
The type of reimbursement NASA receives for launching services relates
to actual costs of providing the services, but the compensation in no way
is intended to provide NASA with a common carrier's profit. As of yet, there
is no law which compels NASA to provide launching and related services
for all who would apply. Although the United States government has
previously created common carriers, such entities are specifically not entities
of the United States government and are created by statutory authority
expressly stating that the newly established entity is to be a common carrier.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It seems that NASA has taken steps designed to isolate the manage-
3747 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq. (1976).
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ment and operation of the space shuttle from effective participation by
private, competitive, free enterprise. NASA has not encouraged the in-
volvement of airlines and airline personnel in the management and operation
of the space shuttle. It has shown no inclination to hire airline pilots as
astronauts or to provide specifically for air transport pilots to qualify for
shuttle pilot astronaut type-ratings. NASA is closely tied to the Department
of Defense in selecting shuttle astronauts, the vast majority of whom are
in active military service." Also, in March, 1977, NASA requested and
received from the FAA a determination that the shuttle would not be
considered an "aircraft" for purposes of the FAAct.
This approach of isolationism and exclusivity seems to fit into the
apparent strategy of NASA to maintain permanent monopoly rights over space
transportation; and the failure of the airlines or other private businesses to
show a significant interest or confront NASA on this point has encouraged
both NASA and the Department of Defense to ignore the parallel evolution
of responsible private industry involvement in both air and space trans-
portation. Airplanes, like space vehicles, are potential instruments of war,
so military arguments regarding the placement of sophisticated missiles in the
hands of private industry have a very weak foundation.
It may be that the military logistical and tactical capabilities of the
manned space shuttle, as well as the costs of fabrication of the shuttle
and other components of the space transportation system (STS), are critical
considerations in the present monopolistic approach of NASA and the
Department of Defense with respect to government ownership and man-
agement of the space transportation system; all of which is perceived by
NASA management as its lifeblood for the future existence of that agency.
But operating in one fashion and calling it something else is not legally
acceptable. NASA cannot do by the back door what it is not permitted
to do by the front door.
Finally, if a segment of private enterprise can overcome at the outset
the obstacles of government competition through management and oper-
ational control of the space transportation system, the greatest market
entry obstacle is still yet to be overcome. Despite exemplary deregulation of
the air transport industry under the Administration of President Carter, the
costs of managing and operating the shuttle component of the transpor-
tation system are so great that the industry mergers are critical to amassing
the necessary risks and operating capital. If this is true, in fact, we are
apt to see the emergence of space law firms which are expert in obtaining
anti-trust exemptions for the space industry.
38 See, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense, the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Concerning the Detailing of Military Personnel for Service as Shuttle Crew Members (signed
by all parties in 1976).
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